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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
For the last decade there has been a growing interest in the interplay between 
mathematical practice and argumentation. The study of each of these areas 
promises to shed light on the other, as I and several other authors from a variety of 
disciplines have argued. I am particularly grateful to Begoña Carrascal for her 
careful critique of some central assumptions of this programme, as such challenges 
are vital for its long-term success. In this commentary, I wish to respond to two of 
her main points in a similar spirit. She writes: “From a review of many of the papers 
[of the programme] … we can extract two main ideas. First, Johnson’s influential 
definition placed a burden on many of their authors to justify the claim that 
mathematical products are argumentative. Second, there is a manifest tension in 
these works between the examples of mathematical products considered as 
arguments and the process that leads to them” (Carrascal, 2013, p. 6). I will address 
each of these ideas in turn. 
 
2. THE CLAIM THAT MATHEMATICAL PRODUCTS ARE ARGUMENTATIVE 
 
Carrascal correctly observes that many authors of works on mathematical 
argumentation have interpreted finished proofs as arguments. She holds that this is 
a mistake, or at least unnecessary; since the proving process is argumentative, the 
product need not be: “there is no need to appeal to special cases to defend the 
assertion that, in mathematical practice, there is a place for argumentation. We only 
have to distinguish between mathematical products and mathematical practice” 
(Carrascal, 2013, p. 6). It is on this point that I wish to challenge her. I agree that we 
do not need to appeal to special cases—because ordinary, rigorous proofs are 
arguments. The proving process is also argumentative, although we should expect 
different sorts of argument in these two different contexts. 
 A preliminary point is that we should absolve Ralph Johnson of any 
responsibility for the choice supporters of the programme have made to focus on 
showing that proofs are arguments. Although both Ian Dove and I have published 
rebuttals of Johnson’s view that proofs are not arguments (Dove, 2007; Aberdein, 
2011), both of us had already defended the contrary view without reference to 
Johnson (Dove, 2003; Aberdein, 2005). And other authors Carrascal discusses make 
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no reference to Johnson in any of the works she cites (for example Alcolea Banegas, 
1998). 
 Much more importantly, our identification of proofs as arguments is firmly 
grounded in mathematical practice: mathematicians themselves frequently speak of 
proofs as arguments, and do not perceive any tension with the rigour of proofs in so 
doing. For example, “A proof is a rhetorical device for convincing another 
mathematician that a given statement (the theorem) is true. Thus a proof can take 
many different forms. The most traditional form of mathematical proof is that it is a 
tightly knit sequence of statements linked together by strict rules of logic” (Krantz, 
2011, pp. 11 f.). Other authors go further, and challenge whether this alleged 
tradition really is a tradition. For example, Alan Bundy observes that “Prior to the 
invention of formal logic, a proof was any convincing argument. Indeed, it still is. 
Presenting proofs in Hilbertian1 style has never taken off within the mathematical 
community. Instead, mathematicians write rigorous proofs, i.e. proofs in whose 
soundness the mathematical community has confidence, but which are not 
Hilbertian” (Bundy et al., 2005, p. 2377). Bundy observes that Hilbertian proofs may 
be easily, even mechanically, checked for errors and yet mistakes in rigorous proofs 
often go unobserved for years. Thus, he concludes, rigorous proofs are not 
Hilbertian (Bundy et al., 2005, p. 2378). 
 Many different terminologies have been employed for Bundy’s 
rigorous/Hilbertian distinction (for a partial list, see Reid & Knipping, 2010, p. 26). 
For example, Keith Devlin characterizes the distinction as follows: “The right wing 
(‘right-or-wrong’, ‘rule-of-law’) definition is that a proof is a logically correct 
argument that establishes the truth of a given statement. The left wing answer 
(fuzzy, democratic, and human centered) is that a proof is an argument that 
convinces a typical mathematician of the truth of a given statement” (Devlin, 2003). 
The first thing to notice here is that Devlin uses ‘argument’ to characterize both 
wings: his is not an opposition between proofs and arguments, but between two 
sorts of argument that a proof can be. However, where Devlin (and many others) err 
is in regarding this as an either/or distinction. A faithful and exclusive adherence to 
the left wing may satisfy Devlin politically, but mathematics needs both wings. 
 
 Argumentational Structure:   Inferential Structure: 
 Mathematical Proof, Pk    Mathematical Inference, Ik 
 Endoxa: Data accepted by mathematical  Premisses: Axioms or statements  
 community     formally derived from axioms 
 
    argument          derivation 
 
 
 Claim: Ik is sound: that is, an informal  Conclusion: An additional formal  
 counterpart of Sk should be accepted too  statement, Sk 
Figure 1: The parallel structure of mathematical reasoning (Aberdein, 2013, p. 363) 
 
                                                        
1 Bundy defines a Hilbertian proof as “a sequence of formulae each of which is either an axiom or 
follows from earlier formulae by a rule of inference” (op. cit.). 
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In various places (most extensively, Aberdein, 2013) I have defended an 
account of mathematical justification as parallel in structure: see Fig. 1. The 
inferential structure is comprised of deductively valid derivations of formal 
statements from other formal statements: Hilbertian proof, in Bundy’s terminology. 
It is the existence of this structure that underpins the uniquely compelling nature of 
mathematical results. However, it is not what mathematicians actually do, as most of 
them freely acknowledge (Krantz, Bundy and Devlin are all mathematicians; for 
even more examples, see Aberdein, 2013, pp. 361 f.). Instead they reason in a much 
looser fashion, but in such a way that they are able to become convinced that the 
derivations of the inferential structure exist. It is this reasoning, which I call the 
argumentational structure, which comprises the content of ordinary, rigorous 
mathematics. 
 If exceptional cases have attracted undue attention it is because many 
accounts of mathematical reasoning struggle to accommodate them. The parallel 
structure depicted in Fig. 1 is loose enough to encompass the exceptional cases 
which Carrascal mentions—unsurveyably long proofs, diagrammatic proofs, 
contested axioms—and others which she does not—computer-assisted proof, 
experimental proof, probabilistic methods. However, this should not distract from 
the fact that it is first and foremost an account of ordinary, rigorous mathematics.  
 
3. THE TENSION BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL PRODUCTS AND THE 
MATHEMATICAL PROCESS 
 
In this section I wish to alleviate “the tension between the practice and the products 
of this practice” that Carrascal discerns in works on mathematical argumentation 
(Carrascal, 2013, p. 7). I will show that the distinction discussed in the last section is 
a distinction between different types of justification and thereby between different 
senses of proof-as-object, not proof-as-process. It follows that both aspects of proof 
are argumentative. Then I will argue that once we appreciate that, we may 
understand the two aspects as working in concert, not in tension. 
The distinction between inferential and argumentational structure is a 
distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, respectively (on this 
distinction, see Kvanvig & Menzel, 1990, p. 235; Klein, 2007, p. 6). Propositional 
justification is a relationship between an individual and a proposition which they 
may or may not believe: “We can say that a proposition, h, is propositionally justified 
for S just in case there is an epistemically adequate basis for h that is available to S 
regardless of whether S believes that h, or whether S is aware that there is such a 
basis, or whether if S believes that h, then S believes h on that basis” (Klein, 2007, 
p. 6). However, it is doxastic justification that is required for knowledge. This relates 
the individual to a belief state, not a proposition: “A belief that h is doxastically 
justified for S when and only when S is acting in an epistemically responsible manner 
in believing that h” (ibid.). In mathematics, propositional justification may be 
Hilbertian in character, but doxastic justification is not. Rather, it requires ordinary 
rigour, which is inherently argumentative: it is the means by which mathematicians 
persuade their peers of their results. 
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To consider a recent mathematical example, Yitang Zhang’s proof that there 
are infinitely many pairs of primes that differ by no more than 70 million proceeds 
“not via a radically new approach to the problem, but by applying existing methods 
with great perseverance” (Klarreich, 2013). As one leading number theorist 
observed, “The big experts in the field had already tried to make this approach work 
… he succeeded where all the experts had failed” (cited in Klarreich, 2013). That is, 
an epistemically adequate basis for Zhang’s result was available to those “big 
experts”, so it was propositionally justified for them. However, since they could not 
see how to construct the proof, it was not doxastically justified for them. Another 
recent mathematical example provides a contrast: Shinichi Mochizuki’s claimed 
proof of the ABC conjecture introduces so many new techniques and concepts that 
other leading mathematicians in the field describe it as like “reading a paper from 
the future, or from outer space” and as “very, very weird” (cited in Chen, 2013). If 
Mochizuki has proved the result, it is propositionally (but presumably not 
doxastically2) justified for him, but it’s not yet propositionally justified for other 
mathematicians. The words “proof” and “proving” are used in lots of different ways 
and the Hilbertian/rigorous distinction which I have drawn attention to is only one 
of many possible distinctions. One study of mathematics education research 
identifies eight different, overlapping senses (Reid & Knipping, 2010, p. 33). 
Carrascal focuses on a distinction between process and product. Several 
observations may be made about her use of this distinction. Firstly, this distinction 
is familiar to argumentation theorists from various sources (for example, Habermas, 
1984, p. 18; Pinto, 2001, p. 119). It is also familiar to philosophers of mathematical 
practice, as the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification: 
“the thinker’s way of finding this theorem and his way of presenting it before a 
public”, as the originator of the distinction illustrated it (Reichenbach, 1938, p. 5). As 
Carrascal observes, the proving process comprises the discovery of a proof by which 
the result is justified (Carrascal, 2013, p. 7). However, the identification of the proof 
as the “product” of the proving process begs the question as to the exact nature of 
proofs. This point has been made by Geoff Goddu with respect to the corresponding 
distinction in the sense of ‘argument’ (Goddu, 2011, p. 87). Rather than 
distinguishing proof-as-process and proof-as-product we might rather distinguish 
proof-as-process and proof-as-object. 
Each of proof-as-process and proof-as-object could be subdivided further. 
Indeed, they correspond to respectively five and two of Reid and Knipping’s senses 
of proof (Reid & Knipping, 2010, p. 33). Crucially, the distinction discussed in the 
last section, between Hilbertian and rigorous proof (or inferential and 
argumentational structure, or propositional and doxastic justification) is a 
subdivision of proof-as-object. Conversely, both proof-as-process and proof-as-
object may be subsumed under larger headings. In the terminology of the sociologist 
Erving Goffman, as appropriated by the mathematician Reuben Hersh, the former 
belongs to the “back” of mathematics: “mathematics as it appears among working 
                                                        
2 Mochizuki would not be doxastically justified if, as seems plausible, “acting in an epistemically 
responsible manner” includes successfully explaining the proof to others and he has not yet done 
this. 
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mathematicians, in informal settings, told to one another in an office behind closed 
doors”; the latter to the “front” of mathematics: “mathematics in ‘finished’ form, as it 
is presented to the public in classrooms, textbooks, and journals” (Hersh, 1991, 
p. 128). Philosophy of mathematical practice needs to pay attention to the front and 
the back, and thereby to both proof-as-process and proof-as-object, and especially to 
their interaction. Mechanisms devised in argumentation theory may be crucial to 
the last of these. For example, Chris Reed and Douglas Walton have argued that 
argumentation schemes represent a point of contact between the two views (Reed 
and Walton, 2003). 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, we have seen that argumentation theory can make a critical 
contribution to three projects in the philosophy of mathematical practice: analysis 
of proof-as-process, analysis of proof-as-object, and analysis of the relationship 
between the two. Carrascal is correct to insist on the importance of distinguishing 
the projects, and she offers many valuable insights into how the first project should 
proceed, but she is wrong to suppose that argumentation theory has nothing to say 
about the other two. 
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